The 56th Division

The dispositions of British troops according to the above considerations had an effect on the Germans, for Ludendorff tells us that when deciding on the front to be attacked he was faced with strong forces about Ypres, that the condition of the centre (the Lys Valley) would not admit an attack before April (which was late in view of the Americans), that an attack in the direction of Verdun would lead into very hilly country, and that in making his final decisions he was influenced by the time factor and the “weakness of the enemy.”

During the early part of 1918 the whole of the British force in forward areas was concerned with the problem of defence. It was not a cheerful period. Closely typewritten sheets of paper flew about in all directions, giving instructions, making amendments to previous instructions, calling for suggestions, and ever warning commanders against attack. The Cheshire Regt. and the Engineers of the 56th Division worked night and day at improving rear lines and constructing alternative ones; fatigue parties were called for from battalions both in and out of the line; machine gunners and trench-mortar experts moved restlessly from point to point, selecting possible emplacements for their guns, and the artillery did the same farther back.

The men in the line were always the coolest in the whole of the army, but the officers were gradually being worked up to a state of feverish anxiety and a certain amount of bewilderment.

On the 9th March the Kensingtons carried out a smart and successful raid, killing about 20 and capturing 4 Germans. The prisoners stated that the German offensive was imminent. Orders were issued for battle positions to be manned at 5 a.m. as from the 13th.

Another raid by the London Rifle Brigade on the 16th was hung up in a mass of uncut wire, but 2/Lieut. Kite Powell hacked his way through and, followed by four men, managed to enter the German line and kill half a dozen of them. They secured no prisoner; still, the information that the enemy front line was strongly held and that they were very alert was of value.

Aeroplane activity was very great from the 18th onwards, and a great deal of individual movement was seen behind the enemy lines. Harassing fire by the 56th Divisional Artillery was increased, and with a good percentage of gas shells. The enemy seemed to give a great deal of attention to our wire with his trench mortars during the increasing bursts of artillery fire.

On the 21st March, with one tremendous crash, the great battle opened on a front of 44 miles, the artillery bombardment including the front held by the 56th Division. But the attack was launched farther south between La Fère and Croiselles.

No less than 68 German divisions took part in the battle on the first day, many more than the whole of the British Army contained. The training, carried out in some cases behind the Russian front, had been so complete as to include the practising of infantry behind an actual, live barrage. The result was admirable. Swarms of men, followed resolutely and closely by artillery, broke through the Fifth and the right of the Third Armies, which were composed of a total force of 29 infantry divisions and 3 cavalry divisions.

The German 17th Army, composed of 24 divisions, attacked north of Cambrai; the 2nd Army, of 17 divisions, immediately south of Cambrai; and the 18th Army, of 27 divisions, carried the attack down to La Fère.

The 2nd and 18th German Armies made good progress against the British Fifth Army, but the resistance of our Third Army limited the enemy’s success, so that the 17th German Army was not able to cut off the Flesquières salient, near Cambrai, as had been planned. But during the night of 22nd/23rd March the Fifth Army was back at Peronne, and there was a deep bulge in the Third Army towards Bapaume. On the 27th the German line ran through Albert and Montdidier. But the right of the German 17th Army was not too comfortable—Arras must be swept aside!

Behind Arras the wildest excitement prevailed. The word “panic,” a humiliating word, can be applied. But, as we have said before, there was always a zone of calmness, and that zone was the forward zone. Had the London men of the 56th Division been able to see the scurrying motors and anxious faces of the “soft job” men behind them, they would have been amazed. But the 56th Division just went on with the ordinary, somewhat strenuous routine which had been instituted at the commencement of the year, strengthening the defences, putting out wire, arranging “blocks,” constructing emplacements for machine guns and trench mortars. Being, however, on the flank of the XIII Corps, regimental officers were subjected to the annoyance of frequent changes of orders and plans.

On the 19th March an order was given for the 56th Division to alter the method of holding the line from a three-brigade front to a two-brigade front. Each of the two front-line brigades would have two battalions in line and one in reserve, and the division would have an entire brigade in reserve. The necessary moves were made on the night of 21st/22nd March.

An order was issued on the 20th that the division would be relieved by the 62nd Division, but this was cancelled on the 21st. On the 22nd a further warning order was given that the division would be relieved by the 2nd Canadian Division, and this also was cancelled on the 23rd.

The situation of the Third Army, on the right of the 56th Division, brought a multitude of instructions. On the 22nd the XVII Corps had been ordered to withdraw to its third system on the south of the Scarpe, but to continue holding Monchy lightly. But north of the Scarpe the 4th Division, on the right of the 56th, would not move until Monchy had been captured by the enemy, in which case the 56th Division would adjust their line to run through Beatty Post, Bailleul Post, to le Point du Jour Post. General Matheson, commanding the 4th Division, did not, however, intend to move unless definitely ordered to do so, and if attacked would fight in three successive lines, the last bringing him to the Point du Jour Post.

This last assurance of General Matheson was of a nature to simplify the possible actions of officers of the 56th Division, and was welcome. That the enemy was going to do something was becoming evident. At 5.30 p.m. on the 23rd he exploded a land mine under the wire in front of Towy Post, and appeared to be manning the line opposite the divisional front thicker than usual. Harassing fire was turned on the German trenches, and the reserve brigade was ordered to stand to at 5 a.m. in future.

In the south the Germans were now approaching Albert and Roye. All sorts of rumours were flying about behind the lines. On the 24th the 169th Brigade captured a wounded German, and he was sent for examination in the early morning of the 25th. He said that the 101st Reserve and 102nd Reserve Regiments, belonging to the 219th and 23rd (Reserve) Divisions, had occupied the Wotan Stellung, behind the front line, on the night of the 24th. These divisions had come from Riga, and would attack on the 26th together with the 240th and 5th Bavarian Reserve Divisions. They were to advance to a depth of four kilometres with the right flank on Oppy, and then swing round towards Vimy. The battalion section of the 471st Regt. had already 60 trench mortars in position, and 8 more trench mortar companies were to arrive on the night of the 25th. The ammunition was already in the line. One may imagine that Gen. Dudgeon’s conference at 6.30 p.m. was far from a dull affair.

The artillery were ordered to fire on chosen targets through the night, and patrolling was active.

A great deal of movement had been seen throughout the day of men and light railways. Troops were seen detraining at Vitry.

And that night there was an inter-battalion relief on the right, the Queen’s Westminsters relieving the 2nd London. The party sent to relieve Gavrelle Post found it occupied by two dead men only—the remainder of the garrison had entirely disappeared. Signs of a struggle were there, but no one on either flank had reported the post being attacked, and, apparently, nothing unusual had been seen.

Gen. Dudgeon ordered both brigades to do their utmost to secure a German prisoner. Every effort was made, but the enemy was found more than ever on the alert, with parties lying out to catch patrols. It is curious that one patrol reported the enemy repairing their wire—it is probable that they were cutting it down.

The attack was coming, and Divisional Headquarters strained every nerve to direct, encourage, and advise for the struggle. Some of the orders are not too easy to understand, and one is of interest as an example of rumour being accepted as fact.

The artillery, of course, was very busy, and we find an instruction to cut German wire and to keep the gaps open! And the order we refer to as being founded on rumour was as follows: “In view possible appearance enemy agents warn all ranks against use of word RETIRE. Any person using this word before or during an attack to be shot.” This was, no doubt, based on a much-circulated statement that the Fifth Army debacle was largely due to German agents, dressed as British officers, giving the order to retire. We cannot believe in a swarm of disguised Germans.

It must, however, have been a very weighty consideration which induced the Higher Command to order an extension of divisional front on the 27th. General Sir H. de Lisle, better known as the commander of the 29th Division and now in command of the XIII Corps, was ordered to take over the line to the Souchez River, on his left. This meant that the 56th Division had to relieve the 3rd Canadian Division, on the left, at Tommy and Arleux Posts during the night of 27th/28th March. At the same time the division was again ordered to treat the front line as an outpost line, and to fight on the line between Ditch Post and Willerval South. But at the last moment the front line was ordered to be held as such so as to conform with the 4th Division on the right; the 56th Division was already so stretched out that this curious eleventh-hour change did not make much difference.

The Vimy Ridge lay behind the division, but the ground they fought on was not level. The 4th Division, on the right, was on high ground, and Gavrelle lay in a slight depression; the ground rose again towards Bailleul East Post, and fell once more in the direction of Oppy. The division was, however, on a forward slope which gave them good observation from a somewhat exposed position (see map contours).

The rearrangement of the line, which took place during the night, gave the Queen’s Westminsters the right, holding Towy Post and Gavrelle Post with one company, while the other three companies held posts defending Naval Trench. The London Rifle Brigade held Mill, Bradford, and Bird Posts with two companies and one platoon, the remainder of the battalion holding posts on the Marine Trench line. The third battalion of the brigade, the 2nd London Regt., held the Ditch, Bailleul, and Bailleul East line. Behind them, in the Farbus line, was one company of the 5th Cheshire Regt., and in reserve the 169th Brigade held two companies of the 1st London Regt., attached from the 167th Brigade, and a detachment of the 176th Tunnelling Company, who were in the Point du Jour Post.

The 168th Brigade, on the left, held Beatty, Wood, and Oppy Posts with two companies of the 4th London Regt., and two in support on the line Duke Street; and Tommy and Arleux Posts with the Kensingtons, two companies in the front line and in support.

The actual distribution of troops on the left is not very clear, as the redistribution was not complete when, at 3 a.m. on the 28th March, the enemy opened a furious bombardment. We find a note that the London Rifle Brigade had not at that hour relieved Bailleul East Post, and that one company of the 1st Canadian Rifles were still holding Sugar Post. This latter company remained at Sugar Post throughout the battle, being placed, with that complete disregard of all, except the winning of the battle, which characterised the Canadians, under the orders of the 168th Brigade. But the London Scottish were also in this Sugar Post-Willerval line. In the Farbus line were two platoons of the 5th Cheshires, and behind them, in the Point du Jour-Ridge Post line, two companies of the 1st London Regt. and one and a half companies of the 5th Cheshires.

The two remaining battalions of the 167th Brigade and three field companies of Royal Engineers were in Divisional Reserve.

The opening of a modern battle is, with few exceptions, a matter of artillery. Brig.-Gen. Elkington’s diary gives us some interesting facts:

“On the morning of the 28th March the 56th Division was holding a line south of Gavrelle to Arleux, a front of about 5,000 yards. To cover this front the field-guns under the command of the division consisted of the 56th Divisional Artillery and 9 guns of the 52nd Army (Field Artillery Brigade), or 45 18-pounders and 12 4·5 howitzers. Six 6-inch Newton mortars were in action in the first-line system, and three were covering the Bailleul-Willerval line (that is our main line of resistance). Of the former, only two were manned, as all the ammunition at the other mortars had been expended previously, in accordance with orders which, later on, were cancelled, but not before the ammunition had been expended.

Between 3 a.m. and 3.20 a.m. the Germans put down a heavy barrage of gas and H.E. shells of all calibres on the Bailleul-Willerval line and the support line. At 4 a.m. the barrage increased over the whole of the front-line system and our posts were heavily bombarded with trench mortars. From 6 a.m. the hostile barrage of all calibres was heavily concentrated on the front line, and continued to be intense on this area until 7.15 a.m.

During the above periods, that is from 3 a.m. until 7.15 a.m., our artillery was firing heavily on the enemy’s front system of trenches, special concentrations being put down, in co-operation with the heavy artillery, on lines of organised shell-holes. It was considered at the time that these shell-holes were temporary trench-mortar emplacements, but from information given by prisoners after the attack, it appears likely that they were the assembly positions of the assaulting troops. From 6.45 a.m. onwards “counter preparation” was put into effect. At 7.15 a.m. the hostile barrage lifted from the front line to our support line, and the S.O.S. went up in the Gavrelle sector and was repeated almost immediately in the Oppy sector. Our S.O.S. was put down over the whole of the divisional front at the same time.”

As may be imagined, the effect of this bombardment was terrible. The bulk of the forward posts were obliterated. But even such concentration as the Germans directed against the front line was not sufficient to destroy all life—it could not deal with the whole of the line. Towy Post and Wood Post had, during the last few days, been subjected to a great deal of enemy attention, and the posts had been moved—but even so the casualties were severe. One survivor came out of Mill Post and reported that the trenches had been “blotted out,” and that the entrance to a big dug-out there was blown in and destroyed.

The Germans, advancing almost shoulder to shoulder, entered Gavrelle, which, as we know, was in a hollow. Although there was no living soul there to oppose them, the machine gunners had the place under indirect fire from fourteen guns, and the enemy losses were severe. But the first stages of the battle were centred round Towy and Wood Posts.

Capt. G. A. N. Lowndes, of the Queen’s Westminsters, was in command of Towy Post, and with the lifting of the enemy barrage and the appearance of the first Germans there came from the post the crackling sound of rifle fire, joined, almost at once, by the rattle sound of Lewis guns, until the whole developed into what might be described as a roar. But the enemy was in Gavrelle and the undefended portions of the front line on either side of Towy Post. Once in the trenches, the storming troops could work slowly forward under some sort of cover. To the rifle fire of the defenders was soon added the crash of bombs. The enemy was confident; he worked slowly and surely round the post.

The glorious little band of Queen’s Westminsters knew what was happening, but kept cool. Gradually they were forced into a small and cramped area; Lewis guns and rifles dealt with Germans in the open, clearing the ground round about and forcing the enemy to seek the safety of the battered trench; but the store of bombs was getting low.

Capt. Lowndes, ably supported by 2/Lieuts. L. W. Friend and J. C. B. Price, after hanging on to the last moment, directed his dwindling company to fight through the Germans in rear, using the remaining bombs, and swiftly, desperately, they broke through and reached Naval Trench and joined the rest of the battalion round headquarters.

But the Germans, coming through Mill Post, were already in Marine Trench, and Lieut.-Col. Glazier, commanding the Queen’s Westminsters, passed a portion of his force into Thames Alley to form a flank.

Now trouble came from the right. The Lancashire Fusiliers, of the 4th Division, fell back on to the Ditch Post line, and the enemy entered Humid Trench. Col. Glazier swung back his right flank into Towy Alley, and held the Germans firmly. And then for a moment the fortunes of war turned against the Queen’s Westminsters.

The 56th Divisional Artillery, aware that the enemy were in our lines, attempted to adjust their barrage in consultation with brigadiers. It was a most difficult task, for, needless to say, communication was almost non-existent. At the junction of Naval and Towy Trenches was a block, and in front of it the enemy was held, but the artillery, probably seeing the Germans in Humid and the end of Naval Trenches, put down their barrage too close and blew in our block. The German hordes quickly took advantage of this bit of luck and swarmed down Naval Trench, either killing or capturing the garrison up to the Gavrelle road.

About the same time the block on the left of the line, near Thames Valley, was forced by the enemy, and the whole of the Naval Line was in his hands. But the Queen’s Westminsters, gallantly led by Col. Glazier, were still in front of the Germans on the line Keiller, Pelican, and Thames Posts. Every bit of the communication trenches which gave a good fire position, every dump-hole, even the shell-holes were manned, and, as the Germans advanced over the open, in reorganised lines, from Naval Trench, they were met with a fresh rattle and roar of rifle fire. The ground was covered with silent and groaning figures in the field-grey uniform, and the enemy had to resort once more to bombing.

Again the Queen’s Westminsters gave up a little ground, but the enemy’s effort was smashed. At 11 a.m. the position was: we held a block in Towy Alley, about 300 yards east of the Ditch-Bailleul East line, and Castleford Post, and the rest of the battalion had joined the 2nd London Regt. in the Bailleul-Willerval line.

The account given by the London Rifle Brigade on the left of the Queen’s Westminsters is short, but in it one can read the desperate nature of the fighting and the gallant resistance which was put up. The relief of Bradford and Bird Posts was not completed until 3.30 a.m., when the bombardment which heralded the attack commenced. All forward and lateral communication was at once cut. Wire and posts defending the front line were wiped out. When the enemy infantry advanced, they simply walked into the front line, rushed the few men left at the blocks in Belvoir and Brough, and commenced bombing towards Naval Trench. The battalion was almost annihilated, and what was left joined the Queen’s Westminsters in Thames Valley and became mixed up with them. The fighting strength of this battalion at the commencement of the battle was 23 officers and 564 other ranks; it was reduced to 8 officers and about 60 other ranks.

The whole of the 169th Brigade now stood on the Bailleul-Willerval line and the enemy was held. Twice he attacked over the open, with aeroplanes flying low and pouring a hail of bullets on the defenders, while field guns were dragged by plunging horses and straining men across No Man’s Land as far as Naval Trench, but each time he was defeated. The field guns fired no more than twenty rounds before being silenced by the 56th Divisional Artillery; and though the enemy infantry had a novel method of advancing—they stood up, threw their rifles forward into a shell-hole, held up their hands, and advanced, only to drop by the side of their arms, which they immediately proceeded to use—they made no further progress.

The right of the 56th Division was, at 11 a.m., in touch with the 4th Division. A battalion of the 167th Brigade was placed under the orders of the 169th, and six machine guns were sent up to Point du Jour, and two field companies of the Engineers to Tongue and Blanch Posts, so that the right flank of the division seemed secure.

The 4th Londons, on the right of the 168th Brigade, put up a most gallant defence. Wood Post, held by 2 officers and 45 other ranks, had been moved before the bombardment and so was untouched. The full garrison was there to meet the enemy, who advanced in a solid line on the left of the wood, but came through the wood in groups of about ten men each, 40 yards or so apart, and followed by further groups of about thirty men each some 200 yards in rear.

The enemy was completely checked in the wood and on the left; but Beatty Post, on the right, which had been badly battered about by trench mortars, was occupied. The garrison, consisting at first of 3 officers and 84 other ranks, though much depleted when the assault was launched, was overwhelmed by sheer numbers, and only 1 officer and 6 men ever returned. The enemy then started to work round to the rear of Wood Post, but for over an hour this hard little band held out and repulsed the enemy.

Oppy Post was also smothered by artillery and trench mortars, and eventually overwhelmed by the storming infantry. Of the 2 officers and 48 other ranks forming the garrison, 1 officer and 5 other ranks were left.

Fifteen minutes after the assault was launched, the enemy was in the Earl Lane and Viscount Street, but were held for a time by the troops in Ouse Alley. But so long as Wood Post held, the enemy did not make any great progress.

Major F. A. Phillips was in command of the forward fighting, and moved about encouraging his men, who were inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy whenever an attempt was made to advance over the open. But Wood Post fell back just before 9 o’clock, and soon after the enemy began to force their way up Ouse Alley from Viscount Street, in rear of the troops who were fighting so successfully in Marquis Trench. Major Phillips promptly attacked over the open with about twenty details from headquarters, and drove them back.

The enemy had built up heavy rifle fire from Oppy Wood, although he was suffering severely there from our artillery fire, and attacked the left of the battalion many times over the open; but the Marquis line held, and at 11 o’clock the position was extraordinary. The 169th Brigade on the right was back in the Bailleul-Willerval line; and while the advance companies of the 4th London were still holding the Marquis line, the enemy was in Ouse Alley and bombing his way towards the Bailleul line, also he was advancing over the open south of Ouse Alley. The position then was very precarious, and the reserve company, which Colonel Marchment had sent to get in touch with the forward troops and form a flank, was unable to reach the forward troops. Major Phillips decided to withdraw.

The withdrawal was witnessed by Colonel Marchment from his headquarters:

“I watched it through my glasses. It was carried out in a very steady and orderly way, the men leaving in groups of about a dozen. Although exposed to a heavy fire from front and flanks, they made excellent use of the ground, and suffered very few casualties.... The men of the reserve company met the survivors returning and covered their retirement.”

The Kensingtons on the left of the division were not attacked. Some fifty of the enemy approached Tommy Post, but were at once driven off with casualties. But the battalion gave invaluable aid to the 4th Londons, on the right, inflicting heavy losses by Lewis gun, rifle, and rifle grenade fire on the German support troops as they came up to the wood. About 11.30 a.m. the battalion was ordered to retire, in conjunction with the right of the 3rd Canadian Division, on the left, and so came into line with the rest of the division.