Spanish and Portuguese South America during the Colonial Period; Vol. 1

Some months passed away whilst Gasca and the governor of Panamá still awaited the decisive reply from Peru. Indeed Pizarro’s situation was such as to make him hesitate. He was still comparatively a young man, being forty-two years of age, and he found himself in the most dazzling position which any Spaniard not born in the purple could hold, and to which, moreover, he fancied he had a right as being the successor of his brother. Were he to resign this he would not only lay down that position, but he would put himself in the absolute power of another, before whom he would doubtless be charged with crimes that might be held to cancel the offers of pardon for past offences conveyed to him by the Emperor and the President. He had learned with no small apprehension the coming of the latter; but he was so simple as to be misled by the unostentatious manner in which the President had made his appearance. He ignored alike his personal qualities and the moral force which he represented. Having before him two plain roads, either of which might have led him into safety, if not into the ultimate realization of his ambition—that is to say, being free to choose either to make his submission to the President, or to appeal to arms against the crown,—he took the half-way course of keeping the President at a distance whilst he should meanwhile send an embassy to Spain to vindicate his past proceedings and solicit a confirmation of his authority, a course which could not but lead to his ruin.

Gasca was meanwhile put off by a letter, signed by seventy of the principal citizens of Lima, expressing their regret that he had arrived too late, and their opinion that, should he now continue his journey, his presence would only be the signal for the renewal of disturbance. But the result of Pizarro’s embassy to Spain was widely different from that which he had anticipated. No sooner had his ambassador, Aldana, been admitted into the presence of the President at Panamá than the embassy was at an end. The envoy now for the first time learned the full powers of the President, and likewise the full nature of the concessions made by the crown to the colonists. The ambassador, though sincerely devoted to Pizarro, instantly showed the example of submitting to the crown, whilst he wrote to his chief at Lima earnestly counselling him to do likewise. This example was followed by Hinojosa, the governor of Panamá, by whose submission Pizarro’s fleet was placed at the disposal of Gasca. On November 19th, 1546, Hinojosa and his officers, having delivered up their commissions, received them back from Gasca on taking the oath of allegiance.

Possessed of Panamá and the fleet, Gasca could now afford to take more active steps. He raised men and collected supplies, taking care that the soldiers were duly paid. He had no difficulty in obtaining loans on credit, and he made use of his powers to summon assistance from Guatemala and Mexico. Much good-will was shown on all sides in getting his expedition ready; but up to the latest moment the President employed every means in his power to induce Pizarro, ere it should be too late, to make his submission to the crown. With this object he sent in advance Aldana, with four ships, to the coast of Peru, with authenticated copies of his commission to be delivered to Pizarro. That chief, who as yet but dimly discerned the effect which was being slowly but surely produced by the proclamation of Gasca, called his councillors to aid him in determining what reply should be sent, or what course adopted, in reference to the letters of the Emperor and the President. His two chief advisers were Carbajal, a warrior of fourscore years, and Cepeda, a lawyer who had come out to the New World as one of the Audience of the late Viceroy. The former, with the wisdom of years, clearly discerned the nature of the situation and advised his master accordingly; but the lawyer, knowing as he did that he had appeared in arms against the Viceroy, whom he had been sent out to advise, trembled at the situation in which he should find himself were Pizarro to yield, and therefore used all his skill in persuading him to adopt a defiant course. Unfortunately for all concerned, his counsel prevailed.

It was not long after the departure of the messenger of Gasca, by whom Pizarro had sent back the rejection of his terms, that the latter received news of the defection from his cause both of the governor of Panamá and of his ambassador to Spain; and these unwelcome tidings were followed by certain indications that they were but the precursors of similar defections from his cause in other quarters. In fact, he was enveloped by a cloud of enemies in which quarter soever he might look. Gonzalo Pizarro, however, though wounded by the desertion of his friends on whom he had relied, yet, having thrown in his lot with the rebels who should adhere to him, determined to trust to the hazard of the die. He summoned his captains to his aid, reminding them of their obligations, and that their interests were identical with his own. He enforced levies in the capital, and soon saw himself at the head of a thousand men. He was supported by the veteran warrior Carbajal, and literally no money was spared in equipping his army. It was a desperate cause; and Pizarro and his men were reckless. There was a prevailing impression that his cause was a losing one, and consequently defections from his ranks were frequent.

The squadron under Aldana (Pizarro’s ambassador to Spain) was now off Callao, the commander having been welcomed at all the ports of Peru at which he had landed, receiving at the same time numerous promises of assistance on the part of those who were nominally Pizarro’s officers. Aldana, who had no rival ships to oppose him, caused copies of the President’s manifestoes to be circulated amongst the citizens of Lima, and they were not long in producing their effect, for indeed few persons there had been aware of the full powers entrusted to Gasca. The only general thought was for each one to secure his own safety. It was a case of sauve qui peut. Some escaped to the forests; some took refuge with the fleet; and others, essaying to escape, did not succeed in doing so, but fell into the hands of the subordinates of Carbajal, from whom they had little to hope. In this dilemma, Pizarro, seeing that whilst he should remain at Lima every day would add to the desertions from his cause, resolved to occupy Arequipa, where, however, owing to the frequent desertions, he found that his force did not muster more than five hundred men.

June 1547

Pizarro and his forces having quitted Lima, the gates of the city were forthwith opened to Aldana, as the forerunner of the President. Gasca himself, however, had sailed from Panamá on April 10th, 1547. He encountered a stormy voyage, during which he displayed his habitual coolness and perseverance. In due time his storm-battered vessels arrived at Tumbez, where he was received with open arms; indeed thenceforth he was master of the situation, and had only to instruct his officers to execute his orders. He made his way towards Xauxa, where he was later joined by reinforcements from all quarters. On his arrival there the war was, in point of fact, to all appearance terminated, for he found advices to the effect that Gonzalo Pizarro was hemmed in on every side. In reply to the offers of service which he received, he had given a general rendezvous of Caxamalca, to which place he despatched Hinojosa with the soldiers at his disposal, with orders to take command of the levies and to join him at Xauxa. He then proceeded towards the same place by way of Truxillo. The President now found himself in sufficient strength to counter-order the force which he had summoned to his assistance from Guatemala and Mexico.

1547.

Meanwhile Pizarro had come to the determination to evacuate Peru and fall back upon Chili, which territory was beyond the jurisdiction of the President. But the passes lying on his route were held by Centeno with a force greater than his own, and who had declared for the President. Centeno had been his subordinate officer, and he tried, in the first place, the effect of negotiation. This, however, leading to no result, he marched against his force, which was encamped on Lake Titicaca. On October 26th the hostile forces met. Pizarro’s troops were about half as numerous as those of his opponent, his cavalry only numbering one-third of the horsemen opposed to him; but this inequality was compensated for in that of the opposing leaders. Whilst Centeno was so ill as to be compelled to delegate the command of his troops to others and to await the result off the field in a litter, his opponents were under the skilled leadership of Pizarro and Carbajal. Pizarro himself commanded the cavalry, placing himself at its head in a gorgeously-decorated suit of mail, which made him the most conspicuous object on the field.

Having arrived within firing distance of each other, the veteran Carbajal, deeming his situation favourable, resolved to halt and to receive the enemy’s attack. The experienced officers on either side saw that their advantage lay in keeping back, but whereas the trained musketeers on Pizarro’s side were under the immediate control of the veteran by whom they had been drilled, the impetuous soldiers of Centeno were not only without his restraining voice, but were further urged on by a senseless friar, who, forgetting that he was not in the pulpit, took upon himself to declare, in the words of ancient Scripture, that the Lord had delivered the enemy into their hands. His exclamation was premature, but it had the effect of urging Centeno’s soldiers forward and of bringing them within the full force of the opposing fire. Carbajal restrained his men until their antagonists were within a hundred yards of them. The volley which was then fired decided the day. Two hundred men are said to have fallen at the first discharge, which was followed by a second. On the other part of the field, where the cavalry contended, the result was different. Centeno’s horse being vastly superior in number, rode down their opponents, and Pizarro himself, though performing everything that skill and valour could effect, was compelled to spur his charger out of the scene of struggle. He was pursued, and had to defend himself in single combat until he was rescued by some of the men of Carbajal. The victorious cavalry tried again and again in vain to break the flank of Carbajal’s arquebusiers. The victory remained with Pizarro, who, with his followers, sat down to the feast which had been prepared in their opponents’ tents. It was estimated that more than two-thirds of Centeno’s men were killed or wounded; he himself escaped by flight. After this victory, Pizarro, being now recruited by considerable numbers, resolved to make his way to Cuzco, where he was received by the inhabitants in triumph, and where he resolved for the present to establish his quarters.

As might be expected, the unlooked-for news of Pizarro’s victory at Huarina fell like a thunderbolt on the court of the hitherto successful President. Gasca, however, was careful to put a good face on his disappointment, whilst he lost no time in adopting such measures as were best calculated to repair the disaster. Taking advantage of his own superiority of force, he resolved to march without delay against his opponent. He had before him a difficult and dreary march, but in its course he was cheered not only by the assurance that Pizarro’s victory had not had the effect of dispiriting the country, but also by the arrival in his camp, from various quarters, of several distinguished captains—of Benalcazar, the conqueror of Quito; of Valdivia, with laurels fresh from the conquest of Chili; and of Centeno, who had escaped through the forest and sierra, and who, restored to health, was burning to retrieve his late mischance.

1548.

It was the spring of the following year when Gasca mustered his forces for the final march on Cuzco. He now had two thousand men, which, it must be remembered, was a larger number than any European force that had hitherto been assembled in arms in Peru. They were commanded by Hinojosa. The first obstacle of importance which that officer had to encounter was the passage of the river Apurimac, one of the most considerable tributaries of the Amazons, and the bridges over which had been destroyed by order of Pizarro. Gasca, however, being apprised of this, had sent forward to select a suitable spot from which to throw a bridge across the stream, which was found at Cotopampa, whilst materials for a like purpose were laid down at two other points with a view to misleading the enemy.

The officer sent on in advance to Cotopampa had received positive commands to delay the actual construction of the bridge until he should be in sufficient strength to carry it through forthwith to completion; but he was so zealous that he took it upon himself to disregard his orders and to set about the operation at once. The bridge itself was to be one of those structures common in the Northern Andes, formed of cables of osier, thrown from side to side of the bank, and across which planks are laid. As such a bridge is swayed to and fro or upwards and downwards by the tramp of men, by burdens being borne across it, or by the wind, it is apt to inspire a feeling of insecurity both on the part of the traveller and on that of the onlooker from the shore, but it is in reality quite as safe a means of transit as is many a more solid structure. Gasca having heard with alarm that the work was going on, hastened his march in order to support his officer; but ere he had reached the river, information was brought to him that the enemy had cut the cables on the opposite bank. Valdivia was accordingly sent forward with two hundred men, whilst the main body hurried its pace. That energetic officer, on reaching the stream, at once procured some native boats, by means of which he passed his men over to the other side. He being now in considerably greater force than Pizarro’s men, the latter retreated with all speed to Cuzco, to report the affair to their chief.

Pizarro meanwhile, like the typical soldier of fortune of that age, had been enjoying the hour of sunshine, forgetful of the past, and not too much troubled about the future. Although no one ever questioned his leadership, he was not a leader to dispense with counsel; and his two chief advisers were still Cepeda and Carbajal. The advice he had of late received from each seems to have been the reverse of that which they had respectively given him when it was a question of the terms in which he should reply to the letters of the Emperor and of Gasca. Whilst Carbajal on the one hand now advised him to abandon Cuzco and retreat to the mountains, leaving an impoverished city behind him, he was urged by Cepeda on the other hand to make terms with the President. But Pizarro rejected either advice. He was, in fact, determined to stand the hazard of the die. The fortune which had stood his friend under the desperate circumstances in which he had been deserted by Orellana on the Amazons, and which had lately come to his rescue against enormous odds in his late engagement, might still stand him in good stead.

But in fact his fortune in these later times was in the sagacious advice and experience of Carbajal. It was the forethought and skill of that veteran that had won the victory of Huarina, and had Pizarro now listened to his voice he might still have continued lord of Peru. When the tidings came that the enemy were across the stream, the veteran saw that the moment had arrived which was to decide the struggle. He felt that he was the man to profit by the opportunity, and he pleaded with his commander to be allowed to go forward to the scene of action. In an evil hour for himself Pizarro refused his request, saying that he could not spare him so far away. Meanwhile the work of the bridge was rapidly pushed forward, and long ere the young cavalier who had been put in the place of Carbajal had reached his destination, the President’s force was in a position to defy him.

There was now only a question of the choice of a spot on which the final battle was to be fought. Pizarro determined to abandon Cuzco and to await his opponents in a valley five leagues distant. Even at this moment the President, having crossed the Andes and the river Apurimac, and being in force greatly superior to that of his antagonist, showed his utter absence of personal ill-feeling towards the latter, and also perhaps his appreciation of the difficulties which had brought him into his present position, by giving him one last chance of safety. By an emissary of his own he renewed the assurance of pardon to Pizarro in case he should lay down his arms and submit. Such at least is the statement of two Spanish historians, and it is in accordance with the character of the President. At length, on the morning of the 8th of April, the two opposing forces came within sight of each other. The numbers on either side were the reverse of large according to our ideas of the present day; but numbers do not always denote the importance of a battle, and we should remember that a similarly small European force at Plassey decided the fate of Hindostan. It may be remarked that the native Peruvians, for the most part, espoused the cause of Pizarro.

The President wisely left the conduct of the battle to his military officers, who were perfectly competent for the purpose, and he showed his habitual good sense in withdrawing, with his priests and civilians, out of the immediate range of action. The commanders on his side, Hinojosa and Valdivia, were a match for the military skill of Carbajal; and Pizarro himself had more in him of the daring, dauntless cavalier than of the strategic leader. As he had faced the situation with all its consequences plainly set before him, resolving fully to abide them, we cannot bestow much sympathy upon him in his present plight, though we must admire his unshaken courage and constancy. At the decisive moment of his fate he had taken the advice of Cepeda in resisting, in opposition to that of Carbajal; and it was the wretch Cepeda who now betrayed him by galloping over to the enemy in the face of both armies. But this act, although it was contagious, perhaps did Pizarro no considerable harm, for his fate was already sealed.

The leaders on either side gave the word for the advance; but the humane President, anxious to spare the shedding of blood, ordered his men to halt, since the rebel host from its frequent desertions was evidently falling to pieces. The Spaniards on Pizarro’s side deserted him in various directions; some went to seek pardon from the President ere it should be too late; others made for the mountains. Pizarro himself, seeing that there was but one thing for him to do, gave up his sword to the first officer of rank whom he encountered, and by him he was conducted into the presence of the President. The latter, we are told, inquired severely why he had thrown the country into such confusion? why he had revolted? why he had slain the Viceroy? why he had usurped the government? and finally, why he had refused the repeated offers of grace? On his reply, in which he attempted to justify himself, he was ordered into close confinement. Thus terminated the culminating encounter between the royal forces and those of Pizarro, in which the latter on the plain of Xaquixaguana, like those of the Assyrian of old, though “unsmote by the sword,” yet “vanished like snow.”

Gasca, having sent an officer to Cuzco to restrain the excesses which were to be expected, had next to concern himself with the trial of Pizarro and of Carbajal. It was of course a mere form, since they were taken in the act of opposing the royal forces in arms; and there could be no question of mercy, since they had both failed to avail themselves of the offers of the royal clemency repeatedly made. They were accordingly executed; Carbajal, who is said to have been eighty-four years of age, receiving his fate with the utmost indifference, and Pizarro meeting death with the dignified courage which he had ever shown. The estates of both were confiscated. It is satisfactory to add that the traitor Cepeda, though his head was not placed upon the block, yet was not allowed to go free. The President was indeed urged to send him to execution, since it had been by his advice that Pizarro had first refused the offers of grace; but Gasca refrained from doing so on account of the service which Cepeda had rendered the royal cause by his opportune desertion. He was accordingly sent a prisoner to Spain, where he was tried for high treason: during the progress of his trial he died in prison. It may be of interest here to remark that the fate which attended so many of the conquerors of Peru, spared neither Centeno, Hinojosa, nor Valdivia, the three foremost leaders on the side of the President, all of whom were soon afterwards cut off. The President thought it sufficient, in the interests of justice and of example, to execute Acosta and three or four other cavaliers who had surrendered with Pizarro. He then broke up his camp and marched to Cuzco.

On his arrival at the late capital of the Incas, Gasca had before him the task of winding up the affairs incident to the rebellion. Some dozen cavaliers, having been tried and condemned, were executed, whilst others were sentenced to minor punishments; but on the whole, considering the dimensions of the rebellion and the obstinacy of the insurgents in refusing grace, the President certainly does not seem to have acted with undue severity: a stern example was needed. He had now to apportion the rewards that were due to his followers, who, as usually happens in such cases, were not bashful in claiming them. Retiring from Cuzco to a neighbouring valley, attended only by the Archbishop of Lima and by his secretary, Gasca now devoted three months to a patient examination of the respective claims laid before him, and to elaborating a fair scheme of compensation.

This heavy task completed, the President could now retire to Lima, leaving his written decision with the archbishop, to be by him communicated to the army. The effect produced by the document on those respecting whose interests it was to decide, was of course one of disappointment. Each man valued his own services at his own price, and all were displeased at the fancied unfair preference given to others. It required some trouble and even some examples on the part of the commander at Cuzco to repress the tumult of discontent thus occasioned. Gasca was received by the inhabitants of Lima not only with the manifestations of loyalty which were his due as representing the crown, but likewise with every demonstration of gratitude and affection. His entry into the city was, however, strictly in the character of a priest and civilian, and no way in that of a warrior.

At Lima, the capital, a fresh series of business awaited him, for he had now to devise a new government to replace that of Pizarro; but being himself facile princeps in affairs, and being accompanied by able judges, he was enabled soon satisfactorily to despatch an immense amount of business. Nor were the natives neglected, the President devoting his sedulous attention to bettering their condition. He did not omit to send his own agents into different parts of the country, to inspect the allotments and ascertain the manner in which the Peruvians were treated, taking their statements from themselves. As the result of the information thus obtained, Gasca and his council drew up a system of taxation for the Peruvians, which might be a standard of appeal. He did not see his way to relieving them, under present circumstances, from the obligation of personal service, which proposed measure had indeed been the cause of the recent rebellion; but he was careful to provide that their service should be less burdensome than that which they had endured under the sway of the Incas. Their condition, in short, though not in all respects such as philanthropy might wish, was put on as good a footing as colonial exigencies might admit of. Indeed all the firmness of the government was needed to admit of the new regulations being peacefully acquiesced in.